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1.  Introduction
In the European Union policy  coordination amongst member states takes
different forms, with varying participants, legal bases and degrees of coercion of
public and private actors. However, one recurrent feature is that the goals and
the balance of interests of the member states and other actors are embedded in
the institutions and procedural rules that govern decision-making and the
implementation of Community law. The peculiar balance of laws, implementing
rules, sanctions and jurisdictional remedies defines the policy regime in the
different areas.
Policy  coordination is a broad expression. It has often been used to mean
member states undertaking the same (discretionary) action – e.g. an
expansionary fiscal policy – at the same time. However, it is not very likely that
this kind of  coordination will occur in the Union (although there have been
examples) since decision-making is slow and powers are dispersed among
independent authorities (the member states and their diverse institutions).
Rather, coordination of policies will normally involve:
i  Shared goals, that is agreement on the common direction and end-result;
ii  Community rules and procedures to force/encourage progress towards
those goals in a medium-term perspective;
iii  Different institutions and policy approaches for the implementation of
common decisions in the member states.
In this context, the coordination of policies may entail a gradation of constraints
on member states, from weak requirements of compatibility – not working at
cross-purpose – to stronger conditions of consistency of policies and policy
tools, up to the imposition, or prohibition, of certain actions (European
Commission 2001c).
                                                
1 I wish to thank Alessandra Battaglia, Ginevra  Bruzzone, Paola Parascandolo and Aurora
Saija for useful discussions while preparing this paper, as well as participants in seminars at
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Moreover, rules and procedures created for one purpose are subject to erosion
and reinterpretation, and evolve in response to the interests of the different
actors and their bargaining power, sometimes with radical deviations from the
original intentions. Consequently, within each policy regime it is necessary to
consider the tensions emerging between the actors and the ensuing modifications
of goals and procedural rules.
This paper discusses three regimes for the coordination of economic policies in
the EC Treaty – “pillar one” of the European Union – namely the Single Market,
macro-economic policy  coordination, and the Open Coordination Method
increasingly applied to a broad range of social policies to foster their
“convergence”. For each regime, the paper highlights the relationship between
policy goals and institutional design, and the evolutionary forces at work. An
overall assessment of their interaction in shaping “pillar one” economic policies
concludes the paper.
2.  Integration in the internal market
The Single Market is the paramount example of “negative” integration –
following Jan Tinbergen’s well-known definition – that is, integration achieved
by removing obstacles to the operation of market forces and “creating an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured” (Article 14 of the EC Treaty).
The institutional design is relatively straightforward. The “motor” is the
principle of mutual recognition of national laws and regulations, first established
by the Court of Justice with its famous “Cassis de Dijon” decision in 1979.
Mutual recognition may be denied, on a non-discriminatory basis, for legitimate
reasons of public interest when it can be shown that the national rules of another
member state do not afford “equivalent protection”.
In such case, the Community can intervene and issue a directive establishing a
common platform of protection – through “minimal harmonisation” – to
eliminate the restriction and undesirably low national standards. Accordingly,
“new approach” directives only determine the “essential requirements” of
protection and not the technical details of implementation; once the essential
requirements are met, mutual recognition cannot be refused and becomes an
“absolute” principle.
Competition policy completes the system by preventing anti-competitive
practices in the enlarged European market and restraining member states’ ability
to support “national champions” with state aid.
Two aspects of this system are worth stressing; in a way they are the two sides
of the same coin. On one side, the system requires the Community to intervene
only when there is a threat to the principle of free circulation but otherwise letsECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND POLICY REGIMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
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different national rules coexist. It is thus a flexible system that – unlike other
parts of the Treaty – contains intrinsic safeguards of subsidiarity.
On the other side, as a result of the principles of “direct effect” and “supremacy”
of Community law, established by the Court of Justice in the early 1960s,
2 and
the Commission’s “own” powers to prosecute infringements of Community
law,
3 the binding force of negative integration on member states is quite strong.
Mutual recognition implies that national rules for the protection of safety,
health, consumers, savers and the environment, will compete with each other;
with the result, it has been claimed, that fear of driving away the mobile factors
of production may lead to a regulatory “race to the bottom”.
Scharpf (1999), for example, has argued that the balance between the goals of an
integrated market and a cohesive society has been skewed unduly in favour of
the former by this “constitutionalisation” of integration and competition rules.
He refers, in particular, to member states’ inability to use macro-policies to fight
unemployment, to tax mobile factors of production for re-distributive purposes,
and to grant monopoly power to public utilities for reasons of general interest.
In reality, the first and second of these restrictions are more a consequence of
globalisation and capital mobility than a specific effect of Community policies,
and the third may be overrated, as will be discussed. Scharpf himself is ready to
acknowledge that a regulatory “race to the bottom” has not occurred in critical
policy areas such as the environment.
But the indictment is more serious: it is that Community policies of market
integration (with majority voting) have caused a permanent loss of control by
member states over the fundamental direction of their economic policies.
It seems to me that this contention is contradicted by actual developments in
important policy areas. I will provide examples from financial services and
public utility services, and discuss some recent changes in decision-making in
the Single Market.
Financial services
Basically, the free circulation of services in the Single market rests on the same
principles as apply to goods. Freedom to provide services is listed, along with
the other Single Market freedoms, among the fundamental objectives of the
Community. Financial services fall within the general category of services
(Articles 49-55 on the freedom to provide services and Articles 43-48 on the
freedom of establishment). However, in 1981 the Court of Justice ruled that
                                                
2 Case C-26/62, Van Gend Loos v. NDL Administratie der Belastingen, ECR 1963 p. 1, and
Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Enel, ECR 1964 p. 585.
3 Articles 211 and 226, and the specific powers for the implementation of competition policy
under Title VI of the EC Treaty.STEFANO MICOSSI
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these provisions were not “directly applicable” and had to be implemented by
directives (Story and Walters 1997). The member states were thus able to retain
control of the content of Community legislation.
In principle, mutual recognition (of national licences) and “minimal”
harmonisation (of prudential rules) are fully applicable to financial services
(O’Keeffe and Carey 2002). A (non-discriminatory) restriction on the provision
of services may be justified by a legitimate (“general good”) interest of a non-
economic nature, as in “Cassis de Dijon”, where “that interest is not safeguarded
by the rules to which the provider of the service is subject in the member state of
its establishment”,
4 and the restrictions are necessary and proportionate for the
purpose.
5
In practice, however, mutual recognition in financial services has not worked
and the market for financial services has remained segmented along national
lines; so much so that the European Council in Cardiff (1998) deemed it
necessary to launch a new Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and adopt
special decision-making procedures for its implementation (cf. the Report by the
Committee of Wise Men 2001). The main reason is that countries with higher
standards of investor protection and business conduct wanted to prevent their
erosion by the free supply of services by providers from other member states.
“Single passport” rules for providers of financial services have thus had to
coexist with host-country business conduct and investor protection rules which
have hampered integration and effective competition.
The prevalence of host-country rules was implicitly recognised by Article 11 of
the Investment Services Directive (93/22/EC), which enumerates objectives of
minimal protection that do not preclude member states from enacting more
stringent rules (Tison 2002). While these may not lead to unjustified restrictions
on the free movement of services or financial firms, in practice large differences
in national rules have been deemed compatible with the Treaty even when
serving similar purposes.
Accordingly, this is an area where member states have not relinquished control
and national preferences have delayed and muted integration. Quite clearly,
progress has been dictated by the needs of the financial industry much more than
the Treaty rules on integration (Story and Walter 1997). Rules and procedures
have accommodated national preferences rather than bending them.
                                                
4 Case C-279/80, Criminal proceedings against Webb, ECR 1981 p. 3305 §9.
5 Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano,
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Public services and the application of Article 86
Public services constitute a sensitive aspect of public policy. Since the late-
1980s the Commission has gradually tried to apply competition rules to this
area, which is dominated by large state-owned companies. At the outset the
Commission was careful not to propose a general liberalisation programme and
proceeded instead on a pragmatic step-by-step basis.
The rationale for the liberalisation and privatisation of public utilities was self-
evident. In most instances public ownership of utilities had resulted in expensive
and low-quality services, slow innovation and large financial deficits; the
interests of politicians, managers and employees had prevailed over those of
consumers. Experience in the UK indicated that the liberalisation of
telecommunications and gas had brought substantial benefits. From a European
perspective the fragmentation of utilities markets came to be seen as a major
obstacle to innovation and growth. Meanwhile, technology had started to erode
the “natural monopoly” justification for public ownership, especially in
telecommunications.
The Treaty provisions concerning Single Market policies for public utilities are
contained in Article 86 of the EC Treaty. Paragraph one provides that member
states may not adopt measures contrary to the Treaty, notably as regards non-
discrimination and competition rules. Paragraph two balances the previous
provision by requiring that the application of the Treaty in this area “not obstruct
the performance, in law or fact, of the particular tasks assigned” to public
utilities. Paragraph three entrusts the Commission with the task of overseeing
the application of these principles and gives it the power – “where necessary” –
to address appropriate directives or decisions to member states.
This last provision is the most contentious since it gives the Commission  “own”
powers to issue directives without Council and Parliament approval. However,
while upholding the use of these powers against member states on various
occasions, the Court of Justice has ruled that their scope is defined by the norms
that the Commission is trying to enforce. In other words, directives issued under
Article 86 cannot not be used to introduce new general obligations on member
states.
For its part, the Commission has clarified that Article 86 only applies to services
of economic interest and companies that are engaged in commercial or industrial
activity, and has declared that it will respect the following principles:
i  Neutrality with regard to the (public or private) ownership regime (under
Article 295 of the Treaty);
ii  Freedom for member states to define public service and public service
obligations; and,STEFANO MICOSSI
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iii  Proportionality of measures restricting competition and internal market
freedoms, in the sense that they may not exceed what is necessary for
effective fulfilment of the mission entrusted to the public utility company
(European Commission 2001a).
Thus, the goal of market opening finds a limit in public service obligations.
Member states may maintain privileges and exclusive rights for public utilities
or special funding arrangements to ensure that these obligations are met.
Restrictive measures must respect principles of transparency, necessity and
proportionality, but they are by no means excluded.
Moreover, in a public speech in October 1996, the then competition
commissioner, Karel van Miert, explained that “whenever the Commission has
to adopt measures on the basis of Article 86, it always takes care to carry out
extensive consultations with the European Parliament, the Council, the Member
States and the parties concerned to reach the broadest possible consensus”.
Early experience with the application of competition policy in this area did
produce controversy and friction with some member states. Their concerns
found their way into the Treaty on the occasion of the revision in Amsterdam.
The new Article 16 (formerly 7d) of the EC Treaty provides that “the
Community and the Member States ... shall take care that such services operate
on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfil their
missions”.
The application of these principles is reflected in the uneven pace of
liberalisation, most advanced in telecommunications and air transport, less
advanced in postal services, railways, and gas, where it is feared that the market
would not ensure adequate services throughout the country, and the technology
and infrastructure lend themselves less readily to a multiplicity of providers.
Decisions to proceed or delay are taken at the highest level by the European
Council, as recently shown again in the case of energy market liberalisation.
Changing decision-making procedures
The Single Market legislative programme was by and large completed by 1993
and soon after started to make its impact felt. Under its rules, the Community
has acquired extensive powers of scrutiny and oversight of national legislation.
Council Directive 98/34/EC (previously 83/189/ECC) requires all technical
measures liable to affect the free circulation of goods and services to be notified
to the Commission; in 1996 the Court of Justice ruled that measures that had not
been notified would be null and void.
6
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The Commission is charged with ascertaining whether technical measures are
compatible with the free movement obligations; it may issue a “reasoned
opinion” demanding appropriate changes and, if the member state concerned
refuses to comply, it may take the case before the Court of Justice. It may also
ask the member state to suspend adoption of the national measure (standstill).
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, member states may adopt restrictive
measures to the extent that they can show that there is a “sufficient” public
interest. Safeguard measures are explicitly allowed under Articles 30, 46 and 95
of the EC Treaty, on various grounds of “imperative need”, and may also be
provided for by individual liberalisation directives.
The post-1992 balance between the Community goal of liberalisation and
member states’ ability to protect public health and safety was questioned
following the “mad cow” food scare in 1997. Member states complained that
Commission powers interfered unduly with national prerogatives. The result was
that Article 95 – the principal legal basis of Single Market legislation – was
amended to correct the balance of powers in favour of member states.
Accordingly, Paragraph four now provides that member states may maintain
national measures – on grounds of major need referred to in Article 30, or
relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment – even
after the adoption of harmonised legislation; and Paragraph five allows member
states to introduce new measures in a harmonised area based on new scientific
evidence or specific problems that have emerged after the adoption of
harmonised legislation. After a national measure has been notified, the
Commission has six months (twelve in exceptional cases) to decide whether it is
compatible with the Treaty – a very tight time constraint in view of the complex
procedures. In the absence of a decision, the measure is deemed to be approved.
If a restrictive national measure is found to be legitimate, the Commission must
immediately propose new legislation.
Thus, member states’ powers to maintain national measures and to take
protective action for reasons of public policy have been enhanced, and the
Commission’s powers to oppose them have been curbed. The Council has
shown that it is fully capable of changing the Commission’s powers when these
are found to interfere excessively with national prerogatives.
Two other developments in recent legislation are worth discussing for their
effects on the content and quality of Union legislation and the balance of power
within the “institutional triangle” of Union institutions.
The first development is the adoption – by the European Council in Göteborg in
June 2001 and the European Parliament in February 2002 – of the new
“Lamfalussy” procedures for decision-making in the field of financial services.STEFANO MICOSSI
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These procedures have been designed to speed up implementation of the FSAP;
however, a side-effect has been an increase in the scope of primary legislation
and the relative weight of national governments, the Ecofin and the Commission
in shaping financial market rules. The reason is simple: the responsibility for
primary legislation (Level 1 legislation) has been assigned to the Ecofin Council
(with co-decision with Parliament), assisted by a new Council Committee – the
European Securities Regulatory Committee (ESRC) made up of member state
officials. The task of enacting implementing regulations (Level 2 legislation) has
been assigned to the Commission assisted by the Securities Committee under
standard “Comitology” procedures. Financial market regulators – such as the
British FSA, the Italian Consob and the French COB – are consulted and may
give their views on legislation and implementing rules; however their formal
task has been narrowed to ensuring the consistency of implementing measures at
national level (Level 3). The Commission has also acquired strong powers of
enforcement of common rules.
As may be seen, the first two legislative proposals under discussion with the
“Lamfalussy” procedures – the Directives on market abuse (COM(2001) 281 of
30 May 2001) and on the single prospectus for security issues (COM(2001) 280
of 30 May 2001) – are characterised by very detailed and complex harmonising
prescriptions in areas normally left to secondary legislation in national
regulation. It appears that member states officials and the Commission are
exploiting their new place in the legislative process to regain ground at the
expense of national agencies; as is usually the case, hard bargaining leads to
complex legislation that will be more difficult to implement.
3.  The coordination of macroeconomic policies in the European Union
Under Title VII (Articles 98-124) of the EC Treaty, the framework for the
coordination of macro-economic policies rests on three pillars:
i  A single monetary policy geared mainly to maintaining price stability and
entrusted to an independent central bank (the ECB), which may support
the general economic policy of the Community when this does not
endanger the primary target of price stability;
7
                                                
7 The Community does not have an explicit exchange rate policy. Article 111 of the Treaty
leaves open the possibility for the Council, “acting unanimously”, to conclude agreements on
an exchange rate system (Paragraph One) and, lacking such an agreement, to formulate by
qualified majority general orientations for exchange rate policy” in relation to third
currencies. Any such action must be “consistent with the objective of price stability” and may
be taken only in “exceptional circumstances” such as an “evident misalignment” of the euro
exchange rate (Council Resolution on the Coordination of Economic Policies in Phase Three
of EMU and Articles 109 [now 111] and 109B [now 111§2] of the EC Treaty).ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND POLICY REGIMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
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ii  Decentralised fiscal policies, which, however, have to respect the twin
constraints of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (Article 104 of the EC
Treaty, forbidding deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP) and the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, aimed at achieving a balanced budgetary
position in the medium term);
8
iii  A procedure for mutual surveillance of economic policies – which
member states “shall regard as a matter of common concern” – entrusted
to the Ecofin Council and implemented by the latter by agreeing and
jointly monitoring the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG).
The first two pillars do not entail coordination to achieve a specific aggregate
fiscal policy stance, although the Council has the power to act in special
circumstances.
9 The policy mix is the indirect result of the independent actions
of the ECB and the national governments. Thus, here the policy approach
displays features of “negative integration” and subsidiarity, as in the Single
Market.
The rationale of the SGP mainly lies in the possibility that EMU may loosen the
financial constraint on deficit spending due to member states’ ability to borrow
on a broader capital market and at cheaper rates that no longer incorporate a risk
premium for exchange rate depreciations.
The status of the BEPG is less clear. According to Article 99 of the EC Treaty,
“the Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the
Commission, formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies
of the Member States and of the Community, and shall report its findings to the
European Council” (Paragraph One). In turn, the European Council shall “adopt
a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines” (Paragraph Two). The
Ecofin Council monitors the consistency of economic policies with these
guidelines (Paragraph three) and, when it finds that they are not consistent or
“risk jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union”,
may issue a recommendation to the member state concerned (Paragraph 4). The
Commission is empowered to obtain all the necessary information from the
member states, and has the initiative in proposing the draft guidelines and
                                                
8 The SGP consists of a European Council Resolution (97/C 236/01) adopted in Amsterdam
on 17 June 1997, two Council Regulations – both of 7 July 1997 – n. 1466 on strengthened
surveillance and  coordination of economic policies, and n. 1467 on the clarification of
excessive deficit procedures, and a Code of conduct on the content and presentation of
stability and convergence programmes, adopted by the Ecofin Council in 1998 and revised in
July 2001 (cf. European Commission 2002a).
9 For example, in October 1999 the Ecofin Council approved a directive to let member states
temporarily lower (for three years) the VAT rate on certain labour intensive services, if they
so wished, in order to cushion the cyclical impact of a sharp downturn of activity in Asia (cf.
Directive 1999/85/EC of 22 October 1999).STEFANO MICOSSI
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preparing periodic assessments of performance. Council decisions in this area,
including recommendations, are not legally binding, although they do carry
considerable weight.
In the three years since the inception of EMU, the present approach has worked
satisfactorily. The ECB has acted cautiously but on the whole effectively in the
face of incipient inflation in 2000 and the economic slowdown in 2001, and its
record of independence has been good (Alesina et al.). Public debts and budget
deficits have been coming down, as a ratio to GDP, and automatic budget
stabilisers provided desirable support for economic activity in 2001 (some 0.5
per cent of GDP, according to Commission estimates). The overall policy-mix is
regarded as having been broadly appropriate, though not as aggressively
counter-cyclical as in the United States (European Commission 2002a, ECB
2002).
And yet, some of the member states and the Commission would like a radical
change. In a widely-publicised pamphlet, Jacquet and Pisany-Ferry (2001) have
advocated strengthened macro-policy coordination that would encompass joint
determination of the fiscal stance and the policy mix, as well as “positive ECB
reaction to structural reforms that boost output”.
They argue that coordination to prevent destabilising behaviour by some actors
(regime-preserving coordination) does not necessarily ensure policy-optimising
coordination, that is “the best possible distribution of fiscal policy decisions”,
notably in view of the increased interdependence brought about by EMU and the
Single Market programme. In their view, policy  coordination at the euro-zone
level would provide support for national reform policies and “relieve the ECB
from the excessive burden of being viewed as the sole policy actor within the
area”, thus reinforcing, rather than weakening, its independence.
This argument for “positive” coordination mainly relies on the existence of
fiscal policy spill-over across countries, due to the (positive) interest rate effects
of expansionary demand policies and other inflation and productivity effects of
the public sector budget. However, empirical evidence of such spillover effects
is scanty (Gros and Hobza 2001, Wyplosz 2002). In addition, the desirability of
discretionary anti-cyclical fiscal policy finds little theoretical and empirical
support (Taylor 2000, Balassone and Franco 2001).
A different case for  coordinating public spending policies has been made by
Melitz (2000), who has argued that – while the effects of automatic stabilisers
are on the whole rather weak
10 – public spending in the Union suffers from a
systemic tendency to increase more rapidly than taxation because of aging and
other structural reasons, and that opportunistic governments will exploit periods
of rapid economic growth to relax spending constraints. Korkman (2001) agrees
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that “there is nothing in the SGP ... to prevent member states from undertaking
pro-cyclical expenditure increases and tax reductions during periods of strong
growth”.
In reality, a majority of member states already have some sort of medium-term
framework for keeping public expenditure and the overall deficit in check,
including internal stability pacts to keep local government spending in check
(Fischer 2001). Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates strong disciplinary
effects of the public debt on the size of the deficit (Melitz 2000 and Wyplosz
2002), and no evidence of asymmetrical behaviour of the deficit in downswings
and upswings (Wyplosz 2002). Buti and Sapir (2001) find that EMU has passed
the early credibility test since “pre-emptive  coordination aimed at reducing
policy-induced shocks and enhancing adaptability to shocks has worked fairly
well”.
The main criticism, however, is one of excessive rigidity of the SGP rule,
especially in view of the protracted slowdown of economic activity in the
European Union since 2001 that is pushing a number of member states against
the 3 percent deficit ceiling. It is argued that the Union is confronted with an
exogenous shock and that the SGP rule is unduly constraining countries’ ability
to take growth enhancing measures. Accordingly, it is proposed that growth-
enhancing investment should be excluded from the deficit ceiling (the so-called
golden rule of public finance). The problem is that the notion of public
investment is ill-defined and exposed to manipulation by “opportunistic”
politicians (Balassone and Franco 2001). Furthermore, the golden rule may open
the way to the excessive growth in government debt that the SGP was meant to
avoid.
In order to meet this objection, Pisany-Ferry (2002) has proposed that a “debt
sustainability pact” be substituted to the current deficit-based SGP as a “sound
finance” criterion; but the definition of the debt would have to include all
government liabilities, including unfunded pension liabilities and any other off-
balance sheet items. The proposal makes good economic sense, since it would
allow greater flexibility to accommodate growth-enhancing investment and over
time favour high-return public investments. However, given that most Union
member states have large pension liabilities, in practice the increase in
budgetary flexibility would be limited.
While a compelling analytical and empirical case for change has not been made,
the Ecofin Council and the Commission are pressing for strengthened
coordination through the BEPG. In February 2001 the Ecofin Council addressed
a recommendation to the Irish government, under Article 99§4 of the EC Treaty.
The Irish budget was criticised for being pro-cyclical and “inconsistent with the
BEPG adopted by the Council in 2000”, in spite of a sound government budget
and the stellar performance of the Irish economy over the previous decade. SoonSTEFANO MICOSSI
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afterwards, in March, the Ecofin Council and the Commission sent a Report to
the European Council in Stockholm on “The contribution of public finances to
employment and growth”. The report posits additional requirements for sound
public finances, namely:
i  The need to avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies, notably by imposing strict
expenditure controls;
ii  Criteria for sustainable tax cuts in the medium term, including “an
appropriate balance and sequencing ... between running down public debt,
cutting taxes, and financing public investment in key areas”; and
iii  A strategy for tackling the economic and budgetary consequences of an
aging population, including pension reform.
The European Commission’s Communication (2001b) provides an ambitious
blueprint for overhauling the content and procedures of policy  coordination
within the Ecofin Council. Many of the suggestions in that document have been
retained in the Commission’s proposals to the European Convention convened
to prepare the institutional reforms of the Union (Commission 2002b).
The Commission wants to develop “activity indicators to provide a synthetic
view of the euro area” and, on that basis, “as an exact an evaluation as possible
of the stance of the policy mix”, prepared twice a year. It also intends to
elaborate, in consultation with the ECB, detailed rules on the appropriate policy
response to changing economic conditions – including rules for the general
conduct of policy, policy responses to particular shocks, and the instruments
necessary for the implementation of these responses. And it would propose fully
specified common policies for the Union and the euro-area.
Strengthened coordination on all macro and structural matters would require
appropriate institutional and procedural changes. The Commission proposes the
following: the euro-zone Council should be given formal decision-making
powers; the Commission should be given “own” powers in the drafting and
implementation of the BEPG, including the possibility of issuing warnings
addressed directly to member states that the Council could only reject by a
unanimous vote; there would be regular formal meetings between the presidents
of the ECB, the Euro-zone Economic Council and the Commission so as “to
strengthen the European view of the assessment of national policies”;
11 and,
finally, national policy-making processes would be strictly  coordinated with
decision-making at Union level.
                                                
11  The possibility of a formal participation of the president of the ECB in the meetings of the
Eurogroup has been envisaged in the Nice Treaty revisions. As has been noted, while an
exchange of views may always be useful, there is a risk that institutional meetings of this type
provide an officially sanctioned forum for fiscal authorities to put undue pressure on the ECB
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The position of the Ecofin Council on these proposals is not yet known.
However, they are surely determined to have the last word on the substance of
policy decisions. This was apparent in their decision in February 2002 to reject a
Commission proposal to address an early warning to Germany and Portugal with
regard to their failure to comply with the budgetary objectives in their stability
programmes.
12 In June 2002, in Seville, the European Council decided to relax
somewhat the SGP obligations by requiring member states to aim at a budgetary
position “close-to-balance” over the medium term, rather than “balanced”, and
by deferring (by one year) the deadline for achieving that goal by the countries
that were out of line.
These procedural changes would undoubtedly strengthen Community
institutions and their capacity to intrude into national policies enormously.
Whether in practice this would be feasible and effective is an open question.
However, some of the changes seem to be already taking place without any
serious discussion of their desirability or much evidence of the need for them.
4.  Positive integration and the “open coordination” method
Historically in the European Community every step in the integration process
has been accompanied by measures of “positive integration” designed to
facilitate adjustment and maintain economic and social cohesion while
strengthening market forces and competition. These polices were mainly of a re-
distributive nature
13 and designed to gain acceptance of the “core” integration
goals of the Community, but over time they have proved ineffective, expensive,
and a source of major distortions in the economy. Moreover, the policy
consensus in the Union has increasingly stressed flexibility, investment in
human capital and incentive-compatible social policies rather than protection.
With the Amsterdam revision, a new tool of policy coordination has found
formal recognition in the Employment Title of the EC Treaty (Articles 125-30),
following early experiments in labour market policy  coordination within the
Labour Ministers Council (the “Luxembourg”  coordination process). Other
“processes” were added in the subsequent years by the European Council, with
coordination extending to structural reform policies (the “Cardiff” process),
macro-policies (the “Cologne” process), and a comprehensive programme for
                                                
12 The Commission inserted a statement in the official minutes of the meeting declaring that
Germany’s and Portugal’s policy commitments “respond to the substance of the concern of
the Commission Recommendation for an early warning”, and reaffirming the essential role of
the early warning procedure in the SGP. But the damage was done.
13 The Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural and Cohesion Funds are the paramount
examples; but the complete list is much longer and comprises such things as research and
industrial policy, the trans-European networks, consumer protection, the environment,
assistance in institution building (as in the present enlargement exercise), and more.STEFANO MICOSSI
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innovation and human capital (the “e-Europe” programme adopted in Lisbon).
The new approach was baptised the “open coordination method” (OCM) by the
European Council in Lisbon.
At the outset, explicit recognition of employment as a positive goal of policy,
notably with the introduction of quantitative targets, was meant to operate as a
counter-weight to the Maastricht criteria for sound financial policies. However,
along the way it has evolved into a “soft”  coordination tool for the
implementation of the new strategy to adapt the Union’s social model to the
requirements of a more flexible and dynamic economy (cf. European Council
2000).
The institutional balance of responsibilities for economic policies has also been
modified following the decision – also taken in Lisbon – to devote, each
semester, a special meeting of the European Council to economic and social
questions. While previously the responsibility for setting goals and reviewing
progress on the various fronts basically belonged to the Ecofin Council, with the
BEPG,
14 it has now been taken over by the heads of state and government in the
European Council. They have also instructed the Ecofin Council to take account
of the opinions of the different Council formations in formulating the BEPG.
This explicit role of the European Council goes beyond the tasks of arbiter and
strategic motor of the Union; it involves genuine decision-making on economic
and social policies and monitoring their application (Commission 2001c, De La
Porte 2002).
The ingredients of the OCM were spelled out in Lisbon by the European
Council and include:
i  Fixing common guidelines for national policies in various policy areas –
e.g. employment policies, education and training for employability,
flexible labour markets, aging and sustainable pension systems, social
exclusion – with dates for their implementation;
ii  Developing indicators (benchmarks) of national performance as a means
for comparing best practice;
iii  Asking countries to adopt national action plans to implement the common
guidelines
iv  Undertaking joint monitoring and review of results, thus bringing peer
pressure to bear in order to sustain progress.
Two features worth stressing concern the role of the Commission and
subsidiarity. While these coordination exercises involve areas of policy that are
not within the competence of the Union, almost inevitably the Commission has
                                                
14 Cf. European Council Resolution on Economic Policy  Coordination in Phase Three of
EMU of 13 December 1977. The legal basis of the BEPG is provided by Article 99 of the EC
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taken on an important role in proposing policy guidelines, developing indicators
and providing comparative analysis of results. Thus, the Commission is
emerging as a main player in shaping overall economic policy in the Union
alongside the European Council and outside the normal Community framework.
For their part, member states retain considerable freedom to adapt policy
guidelines to national contexts and decide their preferred approach to
implementing them. On the other hand, while not legally bound by the Treaty,
de facto, member states face new constraints on decision-making since they are
obliged to debate and decide their national plans in time for the meetings of the
European Council. This also means that they all carry out the exercise at the
same time. Furthermore, their performance, relative to the other member states,
is regularly exposed and compared in public reports prepared by the
Commission, thereby putting pressure on governments to match best
performance.
The European Council has also stressed the importance of involving a broad
range of stakeholders in consultations at all policy stages, from the formulation
of guidelines to their implementation and review. Thus, national Parliaments,
social partners and other national players are increasingly involved in the
discussions on European policies. Their legitimacy and acceptance are likely to
benefit from these features of decentralisation and involvement.
Thus, while the working methods are decentralised, their goal is increasing
“convergence” of economic structures and social institutions. Use of the OCM
does not mean that convergence of national policies will be painless. The goal of
the Lisbon agenda – to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010 – entails radical market-
friendly reforms. Labour market and welfare systems differ widely within the
European Union, and the economic case for  coordination is weak and may
justified for limited goals, such as reducing differences in welfare systems that
may distort migration flows or spreading the benefits of policy experimentation
(Boeri 2002). Furthermore, policy goals in this area have been mainly shaped
with reference to “Nordic” social models; therefore, convergence would entail
greater structural changes in “corporatist” systems in the Centre and South of the
Union (De la Porte 2002).
The formal equality of obligations and parity of positions in coordination
exercises cannot conceal substantial inequalities in the distance that the different
member states will need to travel. The effectiveness of the OCM in muting
political opposition and legitimating the new ambitions of economic and social
“convergence” is still untested.
There is also the question of the consistency of the new coordination framework
with the traditional Community legal framework. Scott and Trubeck (2000) noteSTEFANO MICOSSI
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that new forms of governance such as OCM entail “a breakdown of the
distinction between rule making and rule application”. The success of EU
integration has been predicated on direct effect, supremacy and uniform
interpretation of Community law, which is the constituent element of its supra-
nationalism. There is a risk that the emerging modes of governance will change
the perception, and later also the reality, of the institutional balance of powers,
with unpredictable effects on the dynamics of integration.
The Commission is aware of the problem and is developing principles to
circumscribe application of the OCM. It considers that its use should be limited
to cases where harmonising legislation and binding Union intervention would be
inappropriate, because the subject matter touches closely on national identity
and culture, or national arrangements are so diverse and complex that
harmonisation would be “out of all proportion to the objectives”. It stresses that
resort to the OCM should observe the principle of proportionality, be decided on
a case-by-case basis, and not made when there is room for Community
intervention under the Treaty (European Commission 2001c).
On the other hand, the Commission does not exclude the possibility of bringing
policy areas into the Treaty where the OCM has proved successful and “where
the member states are not ready to embrace common legislation … immediately
but do have the political will to take very concrete steps towards an identified
common objective”.
The OCM, thus, may become a precursor of further transfers of tasks to the
European Union in very sensitive areas of national sovereignty and, over time,
modify the institutional balance and modes of governance in economic policy
making – a “grey area” of Union activity where powers and procedures are
shaped by political bargaining within the European Council without any clear
definition of legal boundaries.
5.  Elements for an overall assessment of policy coordination
The approach to economic policy coordination embodied the EC Treaty has a
fairly simple and logical architecture. Mutual recognition, based on minimal
harmonisation of public policy requirements, is to govern integration and the
elimination of technical barriers that prevent free circulation among national
markets.
The common good of macro-economic and financial stability is entrusted to an
independent central bank, with a set of constraints on national budgetary policies
designed to limit free riding and opportunistic behaviour by member states. But
the latter are to remain free to decide their own policies and choose how much to
spend and tax through the budget and how to design their welfare and social
safety-net.ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND POLICY REGIMES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
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Recent developments in the balance of powers and decision-making procedures
indicate substantial changes to this model, reflecting the reaction by the member
states to a feared loss of control over the fundamental direction of their
economic policies. The main emerging changes concern the following aspects:
i  The balance between Community law and national policy goals in the
Single Market and economic policy coordination seem to be tilting in
favour of the latter; member states display a growing preference for
discretionary decisions that override clear and simple coordination rules;
ii  Policy  coordination at Community level shows increasing ambitions,
gradually extending to all aspects of economic and social policies;
iii  Within Union institutions, decision making is moving “upwards”, from
specialised committees to ministerial fora and from ministerial fora to the
European Council, with ever-more encompassing goals and procedures.
These trends are not based on the results of an explicit debate over policy
design. Indeed, there is little analytical reasoning or empirical evidence in
supporting of the changes that are taking place. Rather, the process is the result
of political opportunism, administrative interaction (as in Maurer et al. 2000)
and ad-hoc Council agenda that fail to appreciate the institutional and policy
consequences of individual decisions.
The main risk is that, while creating high expectations amongst the public, this
ever-more complex and encompassing policy-approach will reveal ineffective
and at the same time blur the responsibilities for policy failures. As a result,
Union institutions could be further discredited while national policy makers
would find it easier to avoid hard choices and eschew attendant political costs.STEFANO MICOSSI
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